Another one bites the dust.
These days the programming should also be considered.
Especially when the computers do not inform what kind of drastic action they are going to pull off.
Example : 737-Max-8 Trim to nose down based on bad sensor data. Two new airplanes bite the dust or water.
787 ANA 2013 engine fuel cutoff based on bad sensor data. Luckily the plane was on the ground and in taxi mode.
This makes at least three cases where bad error data was available from ONE sensor and based on that the computers took decisions to override the human operators.
What I am recommending is that they should instead do what they normally do like give audio warnings like
Pull up, terrain, bank angle…
In the PIA case the audio warning of gear not down was probably not made due to being dumped out of the queue because of other warnings like overspeed and stuff. Not excusable. Just add a queue so ALL warnings are made at least once.
The current kind of programming does not seem user friendly. Hidden code which is not in the manual and there is no warning as to what the computer is going to pull off.
Also the Qantas flight where it got bad data and suddenly pitch down causing many passengers to hit the ceiling and experience negative G forces for many seconds. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
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Here\u2019s a concise breakdown of the Qantas Flight 72 upset, in which erroneous onboard data led to uncommanded nose-down movements and negative-g in the cabin:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Aftermath:<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Based on the search results, the 2013 ANA (All Nippon Airways) incident involving FADEC-induced fuel shutoff<\/strong> occurred under the following circumstances:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 2013 ANA incident underscores how sensor malfunctions could trigger unintended FADEC actions, leading to catastrophic engine shutdowns. It highlighted the need for robust fault-detection logic in digital engine controls and influenced subsequent aviation safety regulations .<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Key FADEC reminders:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n If you tell me your specific airframe or engine model I can give you the exact switch-and-lever sequence from the AFM\/QRH.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Another one bites the dust. These days the programming should also be considered. Especially when the computers do not inform what kind of drastic action they are going to pull off. Example : 737-Max-8 Trim to nose down based on bad sensor data. Two new airplanes bite the dust or water. 787 ANA 2013 engine […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1540","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-aviation"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/remote-support.space\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1540","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/remote-support.space\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/remote-support.space\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/remote-support.space\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/remote-support.space\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1540"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/remote-support.space\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1540\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1541,"href":"https:\/\/remote-support.space\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1540\/revisions\/1541"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/remote-support.space\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1540"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/remote-support.space\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1540"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/remote-support.space\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1540"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\u2013 The ATSB identified both the ADIRU fault and a software design limitation in the A330 FCPC.
\u2013 EASA issued an emergency airworthiness directive in January 2009 for A330\/A340 aircraft with the affected ADIRUs to prevent recurrence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\u2699\ufe0f 1. Incident Overview<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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\ud83d\udd0d 2. Technical Cause<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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\u26a0\ufe0f 3. Safety Implications<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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\ud83d\udee0\ufe0f 4. Aftermath & Actions<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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\ud83d\udc8e Conclusion<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
How to restart if the FADEC cuts off. <\/h2>\n\n\n\n
When an engine\u2019s FADEC has driven the fuel flow to \u201ccutoff\u201d (for example, during a flame-out or as part of an automatic shutdown), you restart it essentially the same way you conduct any FADEC-controlled start\u2014FADEC takes care of the fuel scheduling, ignition, and protection. The exact switches and levers vary by airframe\/engine type, but the generic procedure is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
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\n\n\n\nExample: Turbofan Windmill Restart (e.g., CFM56 on a narrowbody)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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Example: Turboprop Starter-Assisted Restart (e.g., PT6A)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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