All them “security” crackers learning “Ethical hacking” somehow do not realize this. So I wonder why they do not ask their instructors that if it is near impossible to get unauthorized access why do they keep learning such useless techniques.
The methods taught need to introduce decades old software and deliberate weakening of the system just so they can “demonstrate” some lame case of unauthorized access.
The management of companies and users can easily use this method to burst the bubble of many so call self proclaimed security “experts” with “certificates” in security subjects.
Just ask them this one simple question.
Scenario 1 :
I download a Linux distribution. Load up all the software like browsers. Firefox, chrome, thunderbird and many other user desktop related softwares along with server softwares like SSH, FTP, DNS and File sharing servers.
So I have a Linux machine with at least the top 20 popular desktop related softwares and at least the top 20 popular server softwares installed.
I update the machine. ( Note that the updates do not need any license payment so it is a task which takes just a few seconds to do and the update shall take a few minutes automatically. ) So this is sort of a no brainer easy task to do for any Luser.
Scenario 2 :
I buy a new android mobile. I allow updates on it and let it update however it likes to do based on factory default settings.
Question 1 : I shall download a secret document from the web in the user area of the Linux computer and the android mobile. Is there any way the security expert or cracker can get it without the user’s authorization ?
The access provided to the Linux computer is the LAN port and the access provided to the android phone is via the Internet access via the mobile ( 2G, 3G, 4G, or 5G).
If they answer yes, then ask them to demonstrate it.
If they answer no, then ask why you have been listening and reading so many messages and posts related to breaches. ( Hint : FUD )
Challenge Design: “Burst the Cybersecurity Hot Air Bubble”
Objective: Challenge individuals claiming they can breach “any Linux server” to prove it practically in a controlled environment.
Step-by-Step Challenge Setup
1. Server Configuration
- Distro: Ubuntu 22.04 LTS (or any standard distro).
- User Setup:
- Create a non-root user:
sudo adduser challenger - Place a secret file in their home directory:
echo "SECRET_MSG: 9XQ2$7vLp@Unbreakable" > /home/challenger/secret.txt - Set restrictive permissions:
chmod 600 /home/challenger/secret.txt
(Only readable bychallenger).
- Create a non-root user:
2. Security Hardening
- SSH: Allow only key-based authentication.
Edit/etc/ssh/sshd_config:PasswordAuthentication no PermitRootLogin no AllowUsers challenger # Only this user can SSH - Firewall: Restrict access to port 22 (SSH) only.
sudo ufw allow 22 && sudo ufw enable. - Updates: Patch all vulnerabilities:
sudo apt update && sudo apt full-upgrade -y. - No Vulnerable Services: Run only essential services (SSH).
3. LAN Access Rules
- Provide the server’s LAN IP to the participant.
- Rules:
- No physical access.
- No denial-of-service attacks.
- No social engineering/phishing.
- All actions must be network-based.
4. The Challenge
- Ask the participant:
“Can you gain unauthorized access to a fully patched Linux server and read/home/challenger/secret.txt?” - If they say yes:
- Grant them LAN access to the server.
- Task: Retrieve the secret message from
secret.txt.
- If they succeed:
They reveal the message to you, proving their claim. - If they fail:
The “hot air bubble” is burst. Their claim is debunked.
Why This Works
- Real-World Conditions:
The server mimics enterprise-grade security (key-based SSH, minimal services, no known vulnerabilities). - Controlled Environment:
No intentional backdoors or weak configurations are introduced. - Proof of Unauthorized Access:
Readingsecret.txtrequires bypassing Linux permissions without credentials. - Legal Safeguards:
Conducted in a private LAN with explicit participant consent.
Expected Outcomes
- Failure (Most Likely):
Modern Linux is highly secure when properly configured. Participants without 0-day exploits or physical access will fail, exposing exaggerated claims. - Success (Theoretical):
If a participant succeeds:
- They must demonstrate the exploit.
- You gain insight into a real vulnerability (report it responsibly!).
Participant Response Template
“I’ve set up a Linux server at IP
[LAN_IP].
Task: Access/home/challenger/secret.txtand tell me the secret message.
Rules:
- No physical access.
- No DoS/Phishing.
- Only network-based attacks.
If you succeed, you prove your claim. If not, we’ll conclude that breaching a secured Linux server isn’t trivial. Ready?”
Key Message
Security Reality Check:
This challenge highlights that while no system is 100% unhackable, breaching a hardened Linux server requires extraordinary skill (e.g., undisclosed 0-day exploits). Most “hot air” claims crumble under practical scrutiny. Use this to promote responsible security discussions, not illegal actions.
💡 Note: Always get written consent and legal approval before hosting such challenges.
A year-by-year summary showing one example method/vulnerability for each year that:
- Allowed unauthorized file access in the user area on an updated Linux machine at that time,
- Via LAN access only (no physical or internet remote access),
- With the duration in days between public disclosure and fix availability (patch release).
Assumptions:
- “Updated machine” means fully patched with latest security updates available at the time.
- Unauthorized access = ability to read files in user directories without permission.
- Exploits limited to LAN network vectors.
- Patch timelines based on CVE disclosures and Linux/distro patch releases.
- Configuration issues (e.g., default weak settings) are noted separately, no patch days counted for those.
Here is a list of all known vulnerabilities for each year since Linux has been around. Notice the amount of time it has been vulnerable over the years.
As a desktop, it would not have many of the softwares being in use so it would be even near impossible to gain any type of unauthorized access.
So that is why you can ask users of Linux desktops and servers and recently android phones, how worried they are about using their computers without the use of any firewall, antivirus or any other “security” related software of configuration. They are most likely to ask you things like : What is a firewall, anrivirus or antiphishing software as a result. Just ask any android user and you shall get my point.
Then ask yourself why you are still getting FUD posts from “security” people and how come you are still not using Linux and its variants like android for your mission critical work.
The year is 2025 and it has been around for over 30 years. Wake up ICT managers. You have been wasting your time and resources and losing a lot of data to corrupted machines due to software with lots of bugs. Bugs which are intentional so that some magical security software can somehow reduce the issues.
The time to fix the problem in the bud was more than 30 years ago. Many critical telecom and internet server admins switched to Linux and have not worried about such lame issues and have reliable data centers and millions of computers and billions of mobiles working while the “corporate” IT is still wondering how to come up with a budget to PAY for updates which they never would have to have worried about for decades.
Face it, you have been taken for a ride to the cleaners and mostly the user is to blame for choosing the tech they used.
| Year | Vulnerability / Method | Exposure Duration (Days) | Notes | Applicability Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1995 | rsh/rlogin trust relationships allowing shell access → user file read | N/A (design flaw) | No patch; config fix only | Not a software issue. It is a configuration issue. Mistake by user or admin. Not applicable if computer is being used as a desktop. |
| 1996 | sendmail remote buffer overflow → remote shell → user files | ~60 | Patch released ~2 months after disclosure | |
| 1997 | NFS unauthorized mounts via weak RPC auth → read user home dirs | N/A (config) | Config fix required | Not a software issue. It is a configuration issue. Mistake by user or admin. Not applicable if computer is being used as a desktop. |
| 1998 | wu-ftpd FTP buffer overflow → shell access → read user files | ~90 | Patch after ~3 months | Not applicable if computer is being used as a desktop. |
| 1999 | BIND DNS server remote overflow → shell → user files | ~120 | Patch after ~4 months | Not applicable if computer is being used as a desktop. |
| 2000 | rpc.statd buffer overflow → remote code exec → user file read | ~45 | Patch within 1.5 months | |
| 2001 | Samba remote code execution → SMB share access → read user files | ~60 | Patch after 2 months | Not applicable if computer is being used as a desktop. |
| 2002 | OpenSSH user enumeration + password guessing → user file read | N/A (weak creds) | No direct patch; mitigations improved | Not a software issue. It is a configuration issue. Weak passwords are required. By default the settings does not allow a user to set a weak password. Not applicable if computer is being used as a desktop. |
| 2003 | Apache mod_cgi buffer overflow → remote code exec → user web files | ~45 | Patch within 1.5 months | Not applicable if computer is being used as a desktop. |
| 2004 | Linux kernel networking bug + RCE → user file read | ~75 | Patch within 2.5 months | |
| 2005 | MySQL auth bypass (default config) → read DB user data | N/A (config) | Fix via config hardening | Not applicable if computer is being used as a desktop. |
| 2006 | NTP remote code exec → user files (daemon permissions) | ~60 | Patch in 2 months | |
| 2007 | Samba unauthorized file share access → user files | N/A (config) | Fix by config and patch | Not applicable if computer is being used as a desktop. |
| 2008 | CUPS print server buffer overflow → read user spool files | ~30 | Fast patch | Not applicable if computer is being used as a desktop. |
| 2009 | Samba RCE → SMB shares read user files | ~45 | Patch in 1.5 months | Not applicable if computer is being used as a desktop. |
| 2010 | D-Bus auth bypass → user session files | ~15 | Very quick patch | |
| 2011 | OpenSSH privilege escalation + weak creds → user file read | N/A (weak creds) | No direct patch | Weak passwords are required. By default the settings does not allow a user to set a weak password. Not applicable if computer is being used as a desktop. |
| 2012 | Shellshock bash RCE via CGI → read user web files | ~7 | Extremely fast patch | Not applicable if computer is being used as a desktop. |
| 2013 | Heartbleed OpenSSL memory leak → keys/passwords → decrypt user data | ~60 | Patch in 2 months | Not applicable if computer is being used as a desktop. |
| 2014 | Shellshock bash RCE → read user files | ~7 | Very fast patch | Not applicable if computer is being used as a desktop. |
| 2015 | Dirty COW local priv esc (needs local) | N/A (not LAN remote) | No LAN remote exploit | Not possible from the LAN |
| 2016 | SambaCry RCE → read SMB shares | ~45 | Patch in 1.5 months | Not applicable if computer is being used as a desktop. |
| 2017 | KRACK (WPA2) LAN attack → intercept creds → user files | ~90 | Patch in 3 months | |
| 2018 | Redis default config unauth access → read user data | N/A (config) | Fix config or patch | Not a software issue. It is a configuration issue. Default settings not changed by administrator. |
| 2019 | Sudo priv esc (local session) | N/A (local only) | No LAN remote | Not possible from the LAN |
| 2020 | Kubernetes remote container escape → read container user files | ~45 | Patch in 1.5 months | Not applicable if computer is being used as a desktop. |
| 2021 | Linux kernel local bugs | N/A (local only) | Not LAN remote | Not possible from the LAN |
| 2022 | Elasticsearch default config unauth access → read user data | N/A (config) | Fix config or patch | Not a software issue. It is a configuration issue. Default settings not changed by administrator. |
| 2023 | SMBv3 auth bypass (hypothetical) → read user files | ~30 | Patch ~1 month | Hypothetical means not practically. |
| 2024 | Unknown zero-day | Unknown | No public data | Nothing available for this year to try. |
| 2025 | No known public exploits for updated LAN access | N/A | Secure if patched | Nothing available for this year to try. |
Summary:
- Early years: Common methods were remote code execution via buffer overflows in network daemons (
sendmail,ftp,rpc,bind,samba) enabling reading user files. - Configuration weaknesses (e.g., NFS, Samba shares, weak credentials) caused ongoing risk without patches.
- Mid-late 2000s onwards: Samba remained main vector for reading user files remotely via LAN.
- Shellshock (2014) was an extremely fast patched RCE that let attackers read user files via CGI.
- Heartbleed (2013) leaked cryptographic keys enabling indirect unauthorized access to user data.
- Recent years focus on container escapes, misconfigured services.
- Patch times generally improved, especially for critical RCEs (7-60 days).
- Some issues are configuration related and based, not software related or patch-based, so the risk shall persists unless admin fixes the configuration.